Elwin, Juslin, Olsson, and Enkvist (2007) and Henriksson, Elwin, and Juslin (2010) offered the constructivist coding hypothesis to describe how people code the outcomes of their decisions when availability of feedback is conditional on the decision. They provided empirical evidence only for the .5 base rate condition. This commentary argues that the constructivist coding hypothesis imposes an ever-declining selection rate and overestimates base rate bias for high base rate conditions. We provide support based on a simulation model of learning under selective feedback with different base rates. Then we discuss possible extensions to constructivist coding that can help overcome the problem.
In many natural settings, people receive outcome feedback only when they make positive decisions. For example, police officers who stop suspicious drivers to test their blood alcohol content receive feedback only when they decide to stop and conduct the test (positive decisions). For the cases that they do not stop a car, they will never know if their decision to let the car go (negative decision) was correct or not. In this example and many other real-world conditions, outcome feedback is selective and is usually limited to positive decisions. Several studies have suggested that under the selective feedback condition, people make fewer positive decisions than would be optimal (Elwin, Juslin, Olsson, & Enkvist, 2007; Henriksson, Elwin, & Juslin, 2010; Stewart, Mumpower, & Holzworth, 2010) . Elwin et al. (2007) offered the constructivist coding hypothesis to describe how people code the outcomes for decisions when there is no feedback. Under this hypothesis, in the absence of feedback people assume their decisions are correct. The result is too few positive decisions, referred as the base rate bias, that is, when the selection rate is systematically smaller than the base rate.
Elwin et al. found empirical evidence for this hypothesis, and Henriksson et al. (2010) provided additional support.
Both studies used tasks with a base rate of .5-a common practice in studies of category learning. Studies restricted to base rates of .5 or lower are justified when feedback is given on every trial because a base rate above .5 (say, .7) can always be reformulated as a base rate below .5 (in this case, .3) by simply switching events. But when feedback is selective, the resulting asymmetry prevents this reformulation, and base rates above .5 must be considered. Such high base rate conditions are common outside the laboratory. For example, in a public place, such as a nightclub or a bar, screeners will attempt to prevent admittance to troublemakers, but most patrons will not cause trouble. The screeners receive no feedback about patrons not admitted.
We show that for high base rates (.7 or higher) the constructivist coding hypothesis overestimates base rate bias. Then we discuss possible extensions to the constructivist coding hypothesis that can help overcome or mitigate the problem.
Constructivist Coding in a Learning Process
The foundation of the constructivist coding hypothesis is that people attempt to match their selection rate with the base rate that they infer from the combination of (a) feedback and (b) their assumption that they are always right when there is no feedback.
This inferred base rate will be
where s is the selection rate in the learning phase, and p is the ratio of correct decisions to all positive decisions. For an experiment with a learning phase followed by a testing phase, b is the inferred base rate after the learning phase and, therefore, also the selection rate for the test phase. To represent series of blocks of learning trials and the dynamics of learning after each block, we use a block index for the variables (e.g., b n represents the inferred base rate after block n).
Constructivist coding predicts that the selection rate will not increase-and will probably decrease-after each block of trials. Therefore, subjects will almost certainly end up with lower selection rates than they started with. The inferred base rate at the end of block n (b n ) is determined by the selection rate in the previous trials (s n ) and the proportion of correct decisions in the last trials (p n ). Because p n cannot be greater than 1.0, a simple analysis shows that the selection rate should decrease with each block (see Appendix A). If (as is generally the case) people start from a selection rate around .5, they should end with a lower selection rate even if the base rate is very high.
It may be argued that people may start from higher initial selection rates in their first block of trials. First, in many laboratory settings, no initial knowledge about the base rate is offered to the subjects (e.g., Elwin et al., 2007; Henriksson et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2010) . Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they have no preference in making a positive or negative decision in the beginning. Second, based on the current empirical evidence, such as Henriksson et al.'s (2010, p. 8) report on the ratio of feedback in decision-contingent conditions, the .5 assumption about the initial selection rate seems reasonable. Third, even if subjects somehow start from a high initial selection rate, the constructivist coding hypothesis predicts that as they make more decisions their inferred base rate and therefore their selection rate for the next block will decline. This statement is not sensitive to the value of the initial selection rate. So, the argument that the constructivist coding hypothesis predicts an always-declining selection rate is still valid.
There is a possibility that the learned selection rate could increase if there are several true positive outcomes by chance and the selection rate is updated after every trial. In order to address this possibility, we examined a simulation model representing trial-bytrial updating. An algorithm for this simulation is provided in Henriksson et al. (2010, pp. 15-16) . We use the algorithm and apply it for a single cue (stimulus) task in a simulation model (see Appendix B).
The simulation was run 1,000 times for each of four different base rates (.5, .7, .8, and .9) . Simulated subjects started learning with a selection rate of .5. Each simulation run included 240 learning trials and 100 no-feedback testing trials. Figure 1 shows the 99% confidence intervals for the final inferred base rates. The results, although replicating Elwin et al.'s (2007) and Henriksson et al.'s (2010) results for the base rate of .5, show that for higher base rates, constructivist coding predicts inferred base rates lower than .5, which implies a very large bias. Of the studies of selective feedback that have included base rates above .5 (Fischer & Budescu, 2005; Griffiths & Newell, 2009; Stewart et al., 2010) , only Stewart et al. (2010) included selection rates in their results. When the base rate was .8, the mean selection rate for their subjects was .68, a result virtually impossible to obtain with constructivist coding (p Ͻ .015).
Discussion
We believe for a learning model it is important to be able to replicate decision making in different base rates as well as in different feedback conditions. Henriksson et al.'s (2010) study showed that the constructivist coding hypothesis performs well for different feedback conditions under the base rate of .5. However, to address different base rates, especially high base rates for which the hypothesis falls short, modifications are necessary.
There are several ways to improve the constructivist coding hypothesis. We test three ideas in the simulation model. The results are depicted in Figure 2 . The first idea is the exploration scenario: It might be relevant to assume that in the first trials, as subjects do not have any knowledge of the task, they make a few random positive decisions to explore the task and observe the results. Thereafter, having some perception of the base rate, they try to increase the number of correct decisions. Under this scenario, our model makes 10 positive decisions in the first 10 trials, and then switches to constructivist coding. As we show, this scenario increases the inferred base rate. 1 Second, outside the laboratory, it is plausible to assume that people have some initial knowledge about the correct base rate. We refer to this condition as the task feedback scenario in our model. Under this scenario, the model starts by selecting .8 of the trials in the first 50 trials. Although under this scenario the results are improved, the scenario offers no explanation for the results in the laboratory settings where no initial knowledge about the base rate is given to subjects.
Third, it makes sense to assume that subjects do not necessarily code all of their negative decisions in the same fashion, but rather that they are less confident about some of them than others. In such a condition, they code some negative decisions more confidently and weight more as true negatives than others. This idea is formulated in a model of threshold learning in a signal detection context in Ghaffarzadegan and Stewart (2011) . In the current simple model that we use for this commentary, we represent the confidence scenario by multiplying a weight to negative decisions as it is explained in Appendix B. As we show, the result is improved.
All of these modifications help to improve the constructivist coding hypothesis; however, their validity is an empirical question. 1 We thank Peter Juslin for offering this idea. 5, .7, .8, and .9 predicts the median inferred base rates to be . 388, .431, .489, and .496, respectively (i.e., the bias is .112, .269, .311, and .404, respectively) . Thus, for the high base rates, constructivist coding predicts a large base rate bias. Error bars show 99% confidence intervals.
Furthermore, replicating the final inferred base rate is not the only concern here. Specifically, a proper model should replicate the dynamics of learning. Two of the three modifications still impose a continuous decline in selection rate. The only scenario that can produce an increase in selection rate is the confidence scenario. Matching the final result without replicating the dynamics of learning is not desired, and, therefore, a precise empirical investigation is needed to improve the constructivist coding hypothesis.
Conclusion
The constructivist coding hypothesis imposes an overall decreasing trend in the selection rate in a learning process. Therefore, this cannot represent learning in high base rates such as .8, where people learn to increase their selection rate. Studies have shown that the hypothesis has merit in explaining behavior in tasks with a .5 base rate, but it will not explain behavior when the base rate is high. We discussed three methods to improve the constructivist coding hypothesis in order to address decision making behavior in high base rates. The validity of these methods can be investigated in future empirical studies. The exploration scenario assumes a series of positive decisions in the beginning to explore the base rate. The task feedback scenario assumes some knowledge about the base rate at the beginning. The confidence scenario assumes negative decisions are coded differently based on how confident the decision maker is. In all scenarios, the final inferred base rate is higher than .5. Error bars show 99% confidence intervals.
